The Effect of Internal Control Deficiencies on Audit Fees and Audit Report Lags by Luikko, Anna
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Effect of Internal Control Deficiencies on Audit Fees and Audit 
Report Lags 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Master’s Thesis 
Anna Luikko 
Aalto University School of Business 
Master’s Programme in Accounting 
Fall 2017 
 
Aalto University, P.O. BOX 11000, 00076 AALTO
www.aalto.fi
Abstract of master’s thesis
 
 
 
Author  Anna Luikko 
Title of thesis  The Effect of Internal Control Deficiencies on Audit Fees and Audit Report Lags
Degree  Master of Science 
Degree programme  Master’s Programme in Accounting
Thesis advisor(s)  Henry Jarva 
Year of approval  2017 Number of pages  61 Language  English
Abstract 
An audit can be viewed as a part of an entity’s overall financial reporting system, and as such an 
audit has its substitutes and complements. As the benefits of a well-functioning financial reporting 
system, of which both internal controls and auditing are a part of, are in liability avoidance, it follows 
that internal control is a substitute for auditing, and vice versa. Therefore, a weakness in internal 
control affects the amount of audit work, which is reflected both in the price of an audit and the 
length of an audit. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, implemented in the aftermath of several accounting fraud scandals, aims 
to enhance financial disclosures and prevent fraudulent accounting. Internal control reporting re-
quirements in Section 404 have been arguably one of the most controversial aspects of SOX as they  
require the management to document, evaluate, and publicly report the effectiveness of internal 
controls and the auditor to attest to and report on this assessment. Section 404 internal control 
disclosures provide more insight into the internal controls of an entity, and open up a new way to 
research the effects that internal control has on auditing.  
This thesis investigates how a reported material weakness in internal control influences audit fees 
and audit report lag. As a weakness in internal control will likely lead to more audit work, the as-
sumption is that a material weakness in internal control affecting financial reporting will increase 
the price of an audit and prolong the audit report lag. The first hypothesis is that audit fees will be 
higher for companies that have reported one or more internal control deficiencies under SOX Sec-
tion 404. The second hypothesis is that the audit report lag will be longer for companies that have 
reported one or more internal control deficiencies under SOX Section 404. 
The hypotheses are evaluated using multivariate regression analysis. The analyses will be carried 
out to model the relationships that audit fees and audit report lags have to their determinants. The 
data used is taken from Compustat and AuditAnalytics databases and consists of financial infor-
mation of U.S. companies with fiscal year end dates between 01/01/2005 and 31/12/2015. 
The results are that a reported material weakness in internal control has a significant positive re-
lationship with audit fees and audit report lags. The percentage effect of an internal control defi-
ciency on audit fees is 20.2 % and 9.4 % on audit report lag. These findings are consistent with 
previous research, and add to the body of knowledge concerning the effects of reported internal 
control deficiencies. 
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Tiivistelmä 
Tilintarkastusta voidaan pitää osana talousraportointijärjestelmää ja sen vuoksi tilintarkastuksella 
on korvikkeensa ja komplementtinsa. Koska hyvin toimivan talousraportointijärjestelmän, jonka 
osia sekä sisäinen kontrolliympäristö sekä tilintarkastus ovat, hyödyt ovat vastuuseen joutumisen 
välttämisessä, seuraa että sisäinen tarkastus on korvike tilintarkastukselle, ja päinvastoin. Tämän 
vuoksi sisäinen kontrollipuute vaikuttaa tilintarkastustyön määrään, mikä vaikuttaa sekä tilin-
tarkastuksen hintaan että kestoon. 
Sarbanes-Oxley laki, joka säädettiin useiden kirjanpitopetosskandaalien seurauksena, pyrkii 
parantamaan tilinpäätöstietoja ja ehkäisemään vääristeltyä kirjanpitoa. Sisäisen valvonnan 
raportointivastuut 404-pykälässä ovat olleet SOX:n kiistanalaisimpia velvoitteita, sillä ne 
edellyttävät johtoa dokumentoimaan, arvioimaan ja julkisesti raportoimaan sisäisten kontrollien 
toimivuudesta ja tilintarkastajaa lausumaan johdon arvion paikkansapitävyydestä. 404-pykälän 
edellyttämä raportointi sisäisten kontrollien toimivuudesta antaa enemmän tietoa yhteisön 
sisäisistä kontrolleista ja samalla mahdollistaa uuden tavan tutkia sisäisen kontrollin vaikutuksia 
tilintarkastukseen. 
Tämä Pro Gradu –tutkielma käsittelee miten raportoitu sisäinen kontrollipuute vaikuttaa 
tilintarkastuspalkkioihin ja tilintarkastuksen kestoon. Sisäinen kontrollipuute todennäköisesti lisää 
tilintarkastustyön määrää ja oletuksena on että raportoitu sisäinen kontrollipuutee nostaa 
tilintarkastuksen hintaa ja pidentää sen kestoa. Ensimmäinen hypoteesi on että 
tilintarkastuspalkkiot ovat suurempia yhteisöille, jotka ovat raportoineet vähintään yhden sisäisen 
kontrollipuutteen SOX 404-pykälän mukaisesti. Toinen hypoteesi on että tilintarkastusviive on 
pidempi yhteisöille jotka ovat raportoineet vähintään yhden sisäisen kontrollipuutteen SOX 404-
pykälän mukaisesti. 
Hypoteesit pyritään todentamaan käyttämällä monimuuttujaregressioanalyysia. Analyysit 
tehdään jotta saataisiin mallinnettua tilintarkastuspalkkioiden ja tilintarkastusviiveen suhdetta 
niiden tekijöihin. Käytettävä data on haettu Compustat ja AuditAnalytics –järjestelmistä ja koostuu 
yhdysvaltalaisyritysten taloudellisesta informaatiosta tilikausilta, jotka päättyivät välillä 1.1.2005-
31.12.2015. 
Tutkimustuloksena on että sisäisellä kontrollipuutteella on tilastollisesti merkittävä positiivinen 
vaikutus tilintarkastuspalkkioihin ja tilintarkastusviiveeseen. Sisäisen kontrollipuutteen 
prosenttivaikutus tilintarkastuspalkkioihin on 20.2 % ja tilintarkastusviiveeseen 9.4 %. Nämä 
tutkimustulokset ovat linjassa aiemman tutkimuksen kanssa, ja lisäävät tietoa sisäisten 
kontrollipuutteiden vaikutuksista. 
 
Avainsanat  sisäinen kontrollipuute, tilintarkastuspalkkio, tilintarkastusviive, Sarbanes-Oxley 
 
4 
 
Table of Contents 
1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 7 
1.1 Background ................................................................................................... 7 
1.2 Hypotheses and Research Design ............................................................... 8 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis .................................................................................. 9 
2 Internal Control and Internal Control Deficiencies ............................................. 10 
2.1 Components of Internal Control .................................................................. 10 
2.2 Internal Control and Auditing ...................................................................... 10 
2.3 Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Internal Control Audits ......................................... 11 
2.4 Determinants of Material Weaknesses in Financial Reporting .................... 12 
3 Determinants of Audit Fees ............................................................................... 15 
3.1 Overview of Audit Pricing Theory ................................................................ 15 
3.2 Size ............................................................................................................. 15 
3.3 Complexity .................................................................................................. 16 
3.4 Audit Risk .................................................................................................... 17 
3.5 Profitability and Leverage ........................................................................... 18 
3.6 Form of Ownership ..................................................................................... 19 
3.7 Free Cash Flow .......................................................................................... 19 
3.8 Location ...................................................................................................... 20 
3.9 Fiscal Year End Date .................................................................................. 20 
3.10 Audit Report Lag ....................................................................................... 21 
3.11 Auditor Attributes ...................................................................................... 21 
3.12 Internal Control ......................................................................................... 22 
4 Determinants of Audit Report Lag ..................................................................... 24 
4.1 Overview of Audit Report Lag ..................................................................... 24 
4.2 Pressure for Prompt Reporting ................................................................... 24 
4.3 Form of Ownership ..................................................................................... 25 
4.4 Complexity .................................................................................................. 25 
4.5 Profitability and Leverage ........................................................................... 26 
4.6 Audit Technology ........................................................................................ 26 
4.7 Auditor’s Resources and Resource Allocation ............................................ 27 
4.8 Non-Audit Services ..................................................................................... 28 
4.9 Internal Control ........................................................................................... 28 
4.10 Other Determinants of Audit Report Lag ................................................... 29 
5 Data and Methods ............................................................................................. 30 
5.1 Data ............................................................................................................ 30 
5.1.1 Data Selection ...................................................................................... 30 
5.1.2 Descriptive Statistics ............................................................................ 30 
5.2 Methods ...................................................................................................... 33 
5.2.1 Multivariate Regression Analysis ......................................................... 33 
5.2.2 Defining the Regression Models .......................................................... 35 
5.2.3 Limitations of the Models ...................................................................... 38 
5 
 
6 Findings ............................................................................................................. 39 
6.1 Results of the Multivariate Regression Analyses ........................................ 39 
6.1.1 Audit Fee Model Results ...................................................................... 39 
6.1.2 Audit Report Lag Model Results ........................................................... 42 
6.2 Model Diagnostics ...................................................................................... 44 
6.2.1 Audit Fee Model Diagnostics ................................................................ 44 
6.2.2 Audit Report Lag Model Diagnostics .................................................... 48 
7 Discussion ......................................................................................................... 52 
7.1 Relationship between Internal Control Deficiencies and Audit Fees ........... 52 
7.2 Relationship between Internal Control Deficiencies and Audit Report Lag . 54 
8 Conclusions ....................................................................................................... 56 
References ........................................................................................................... 58 
Appendices ........................................................................................................... 60 
 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics of Audit Fee Model Variables ................................ 31 
Table 2 Pearson's Product-Moment Correlations of Independent Variables in the 
Audit Fee Model ................................................................................................... 31 
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics for Audit Report Lag Model Variables .................... 32 
Table 4 Pearson Product-Moment Correlations of Independent Variables in the 
Audit Report Lag Model ........................................................................................ 33 
Table 5 Hypothesized Relationships between the Dependent Variable ln(AF) and 
the Independent Variables ................................................................................... 37 
Table 6 Hypothesized Relationships between the Dependent Variable ln(ARL) and 
the Independent Variables ................................................................................... 38 
Table 7 Multivariate Regression Results, Dependent Variable ln(AF) .................. 39 
Table 8 Sensitivity Analysis, Dependent Variable ln(AF) ...................................... 41 
Table 9 Multivariate Regression Results, Dependent Variable ln(ARL) ............... 42 
Table 10 Sensitivity Analysis, Dependent Variable ln(ARL) ................................. 43 
Table 11 Tolerance and VIF Values, Dependent Variable ln(AF) ......................... 47 
Table 12 Multicollinearity Diagnostics, Dependent Variable ln(AF) ...................... 47 
Table 13 Multicollinearity Diagnostics, Dependent Variable ln(ARL) .................... 50 
6 
 
Table 14 Tolerance and VIF Values, Dependent Variable ln(ARL) ...................... 51 
Table 15 Hypothesized and Actual Signs of the Coefficients, Dependent Variable 
ln(AF) ................................................................................................................... 52 
Table 16 Hypothesized and Actual Signs of Coefficients, Dependent Variable 
ln(ARL) ................................................................................................................. 55 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1 Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residuals, Dependent 
Variable ln(AF) ..................................................................................................... 44 
Figure 2 Histogram of Residuals, Dependent Variable ln(AF) .............................. 45 
Figure 3 Scatterplot, Dependent Variable ln(AF) .................................................. 46 
Figure 4 Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual, Dependent 
Variable ln(ARL) ................................................................................................... 48 
Figure 5 Histogram, Dependent Variable ln(ARL) ................................................ 49 
Figure 6 Scatterplot, Dependent Variable ln(ARL) ............................................... 50 
 
List of Appendices 
Appendix 1: Scatterplot of the Residuals of the Audit Fee Model          60 
Appendix 2: Scatterplot of the Residuals of the Audit Report Lag Model         61
7 
 
1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
 
Auditing has risen from the need of objective evaluation of information presented in 
a financial statement of an entity. This need arises from information asymmetry and 
conflicts of interest between those producing the financial statements and those us-
ing the financial statements. The former is the entity’s management, who are re-
sponsible for managing the entity’s assets, while the latter are the entity’s owners, 
who have invested in the company and are thus interested in its financial perfor-
mance. The management generally has more information regarding the entity’s fi-
nancial position than the owners, especially when ownership is spread out and the 
owners are not actively involved in the management of the entity. There is thus an 
asymmetry of information. 
 
The management’s goals may not always coincide with those of the owners, which 
creates a conflict of interest. This conflict can be somewhat mediated by manage-
ment reporting to the owners, for example, by presenting them with financial state-
ments. Due to the information asymmetry, the owners cannot themselves verify the 
accuracy of the financial reports. The reports are also somewhat influenced by man-
agement’s assertions, which the management cannot evaluate objectively. To re-
solve the issues of information asymmetry and conflicts of interest, the management 
can employ an independent auditor, who reports on the fairness of the financial 
statements. The auditor gathers evidence to evaluate the financial statements and 
reports on whether they give a true and fair view of the entity’s financial situation. 
An unmodified opinion, or a ‘clear report’, adds to the credibility of the financial state-
ments, and thus reduces the information risk of the owners. (Eilifsen et al 2014: 5–
7) 
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, implemented in the aftermath of several accounting fraud 
scandals, aims to enhance financial disclosures and prevent fraudulent accounting. 
SOX marked an unprecedented shift from self-regulation to government-regulation 
in the history of regulatory intervention in US audit markets and has been a focal 
point in auditing research. Internal control reporting requirements in Section 404 
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have been arguably one of the most controversial aspects of SOX. (DeFond and 
Zhang 2014) Many have asserted that SOX Section 404 imposes an extreme bur-
den on entities as it requires them to not only document, evaluate, and publicly re-
port the effectiveness of internal controls but also to have the auditor attest to and 
report on this assessment (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and Kinney 2007: 189). Sec-
tion 404 internal control disclosures provide more insight into the internal controls of 
an entity, and open up a new way to research the effects of internal control on au-
diting. 
 
1.2 Hypotheses and Research Design 
 
According to Simunic, an external audit can be viewed as a part of an entity’s overall 
financial reporting system. From this view point, an audit is an economic good, which 
has its substitutes and complements. As the benefits of a well-functioning financial 
reporting system, of which both internal controls and auditing are a part of, are in 
liability avoidance, it follows that internal control is a substitute for auditing, and vice 
versa. (Simunic 1980: 162) If internal control is a substitute for auditing, a weakness 
in internal control would affect the amount of audit work, which would be reflected 
both in the price of an audit and the length of an audit. 
 
First, we will investigate how a reported internal control deficiency influences audit 
fees. As a weakness in internal control will likely lead to more audit work, the as-
sumption is that the presence of an internal control deficiency will increase the price 
of an audit. The assumption is supported by prior research by Raghunandan and 
Rama (Raghunandan and Rama 2006). 
 
Hypothesis 1: Audit fees will be higher for companies that have reported one or 
more internal control deficiencies under SOX Section 404. 
 
Second, we will determine the relationship between a reported internal control defi-
ciency and audit report lag, which is the number of days between fiscal year end 
and the date of the audit report. As an internal control deficiency should increase 
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the amount of audit work, it should also increase audit report lag. Munsif, Raghunan-
dan, and Rama found evidence of a positive relationship between reported internal 
control deficiencies and audit report lags (Munsif, Raghunandan, and Rama 2012). 
 
Hypothesis 2: Audit report lag will be longer for companies that have reported one 
or more internal control deficiencies under SOX Section 404. 
 
The hypotheses will be evaluated using multivariate regression analysis. The anal-
yses will be carried out to model the relationships that audit fees and audit report 
lags have to their determinants. The data used is taken from Compustat and Au-
ditAnalytics databases and consists of financial information of U.S. companies with 
fiscal year end dates between 01/01/2005 and 31/12/2015. Prior research has not 
included as long a time period or as many observations. Raghunandan and Rama’s 
research, for example, focused on the first years after the implementation of SOX 
Section 404. As time passes from the implementation of SOX Section 404, more 
data on internal control deficiencies becomes available, allowing the inclusion of a 
larger number of observations to the data to be studied. 
 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
 
The introduction presented in section 1 is followed by a literature review broken 
down into three sections: section 2 presents the concept of internal control and in-
ternal control deficiencies, section 3 cover the determinants of audit fees found in 
prior research, and section 4 discusses the determinants of audit report lags found 
in prior research. The literature review is followed by data and methods in section 
5, which goes over the data selection process and descriptive statistics of the data. 
Section 6 consists of model diagnostics of the regression analyses and the results 
of the analyses, while section 7 includes the evaluation of the results in light of pre-
vious research. The last section of the thesis, section 8, is conclusions. 
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2 Internal Control and Internal Control Deficiencies 
 
2.1 Components of Internal Control 
 
An entity’s management is responsible for designing and implementing a system of 
internal controls that ensures financial and non-financial reporting is reliable and 
timely, operations are effective and efficient, and applicable laws and regulations 
are followed. According to the COSO framework, internal control can be further bro-
ken down into five components: control environment, entity’s risk assessment, con-
trol activities, information and communication, and monitoring activities. The control 
environment is the set of rules, guidelines, and organisational structures that form 
the foundation for internal control in an organisation. This environment sets the tone 
of internal control in an entity. The entity’s risk assessment process covers the iden-
tification and assessment of risks to the entity’s objectives as well as the identifica-
tion and assessment of risk-reducing changes. Control activities mitigate risks to the 
achievement of the entity’s goals and are performed on all organisational levels. 
Control activities include approvals, authorisations, verifications, reconciliations, 
and segregation of duties. Information and communication are needed so that eve-
ryone within the entity is aware of internal control responsibilities and understands 
the importance of those controls. Monitoring activities are ongoing or separate eval-
uations of controls to determine whether they are operating effectively. Together 
these five components represent what the entity needs to do in order to achieve the 
three objectives of internal control: operations, reporting, and compliance. An audi-
tor is mainly concerned with how internal control affects the external financial re-
porting. (Eilifsen et al, 2014) 
 
2.2 Internal Control and Auditing 
 
The auditor is required to obtain an understanding of an entity’s internal control, 
covering all five components listed above. The auditor might, for example, interview 
the entity’s management to get a sense of the control environment of the company. 
If the entity makes extensive use of IT systems, the auditor needs to understand the 
controls that are relevant for the financial reporting process. The auditor then uses 
this understanding to identify what kinds of misstatements may occur, factors that 
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contribute to the risk of a material misstatement, and design substantive tests and 
tests of controls. In testing the control, the auditor may detect a deficiency in internal 
control. The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board defines it as follows: “A 
deficiency in internal control over financial reporting exists when the design or op-
eration of a control does not allow management or employees, in the normal course 
of performing their assigned functions, to prevent or detect misstatements on a 
timely basis.”1 An internal control deficiency may result from a control that is de-
signed, implemented or operated in a way that renders the control ineffective. It may 
also result from missing a necessary control altogether. (Eilifsen et al, 2014)  
 
2.3 Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Internal Control Audits 
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was signed into law in July 2002 in the aftermath of ac-
counting scandals such as Enron and WorldCom. The Act mandated numerous re-
forms to enhance corporate responsibility and financial disclosures as well as com-
bat corporate and accounting fraud, and created the "Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board" (SEC 2013). Since its implementation, SOX has been a focal point 
in auditing research. Some major SOX provisions are the requirement of financial 
expertise on audit committees, Section 404 audits, restrictions on employing former 
auditors, and mandated PCAOB inspections. Arguably the costliest and most con-
troversial SOX provision is Section 404. (DeFond and Zhang 2014) It has been es-
timated that the average SOX implementation costs per client were $ 2 million 
(Krishnan et al. 2008). 
 
Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires that annual reports filed with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission in the United States shall “contain an internal 
control report, which shall: 
1) state the responsibility of management for establishing and maintaining an 
adequate internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting; 
and 
                                                      
1 https://pcaobus.org/Standards/Auditing/Pages/Auditing_Standard_5_Appendix_A.aspx  
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2) contain an assessment, as of the end of the most recent fiscal year of the 
issuer, of the effectiveness of the internal control structure and procedures of 
the issuer for financial reporting.” 
In addition, section 404 states that “[W]ith respect to the internal control assessment 
required by subsection (a), each registered public accounting firm that prepares or 
issues the audit report for the issuer shall attest to, and report on, the assessment 
made by the management of the issuer ... Any such attestation shall not be the 
subject of a separate engagement.” Section 404 thus requires that both manage-
ment and the auditor to report on the effectiveness of internal control of the entity. 
(Raghunandan and Rama 2006: 100-101) 
 
As mentioned earlier, there are high costs associated with implementing section 
404, and a substantial part of these costs are audit fees. Previously, in the pre-SOX 
era, auditors could choose not to rely on internal controls and only conduct substan-
tive testing. However, SOX Section 404 requires the auditor to not only evaluate 
management’s statement on the effectiveness of internal control but also to conduct 
an independent assessment of internal controls. This change means that in follow-
ing the implementation of Section 404 auditors are always required to test internal 
controls, which increases the amount of effort required by the audits of internal con-
trol. Additional work is required if a material weakness in internal control is detected, 
as then the auditor will need to carry out additional testing, discuss the matter with 
the entity’s management, and document the reasoning why a material weakness 
was classified as such, as opposed to a significant deficiency, which does not need 
to be reported in the SEC filings. (Raghunandan and Rama 2006: 101-102) 
 
2.4 Determinants of Material Weaknesses in Financial Reporting 
 
Prior to SOX-mandated internal control audits, required under Section 404, internal 
control deficiencies could be reported under Section 302. Section 302 required man-
agement to evaluate internal controls and procedures, report on this evaluation, and 
report any internal control deficiency identified, if management concludes the defi-
ciency should be publicly disclosed. As opposed to Section 404, Section 302 allows 
for more managerial discretion.  In a study on internal control disclosures under 
Section 302 prior to the implementation of Section 404, Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, 
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and Kinney find that entities reporting internal control deficiencies have more com-
plex operations, recent organisational changes, higher auditor turnover, and less 
resources dedicated to internal control. Additionally, the study found that smaller, 
financially distressed firms are more likely to disclose internal control deficiencies, 
and that an auditor resignation in the year prior to the internal control deficiency 
disclosure is a highly significant risk factor in explaining the occurrence of internal 
control deficiencies. The entities disclosing internal control deficiencies under Sec-
tion 302 are more likely audited by a dominant auditor and are more likely to issue 
financial restatements. (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and Kinney 2007: 166-168, 190) 
 
In their 2007 study on determinants of internal control weaknesses over financial 
reporting, Doyle, Ge, and McVay find that the determinants of disclosed material 
weaknesses vary based on the reason for the material weakness and the perva-
siveness of the material weakness. Three different categories based on the reason 
behind a material weakness disclosure are formed: staffing, complexity, and gen-
eral. In comparison to complexity and general weaknesses, staffing issues are more 
pervasive smaller, younger, and financially weaker entities, which most often have 
the least complex organisational structures. In addition, these entities tend to have 
higher sales growth. These findings imply that the younger, growing firms may strug-
gle to commit the sufficient resources required to maintain strong internal controls. 
Entities with complexity weaknesses, on the other hand, tend to be the largest, old-
est, and most operationally diverse as well as have the highest governance quality. 
Lastly, general material weaknesses are reported by a diverse group of entities, as 
general weaknesses cover a large range of internal control issues, ranging from 
lacking documentation to problems with revenue recognition. Compared to the other 
two categories, this category includes more issues that are related to earnings man-
agement, and interestingly it appears that the control deficiencies detected might be 
associated with poor governance. (Doyle, Ge, and McVay 2007: 197, 214) 
 
With regard to their severity, material weaknesses can be divided into account-spe-
cific and company-level material weaknesses. An account-specific material weak-
ness only affects the account balance in question, and this type of weakness could 
possibly be identified by the auditor and through more substantive audit procedures 
sufficient audit evidence could still be obtained from that account, thus posing no 
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serious concern for the overall reliability of the entity’s financial statements. Entities 
reporting account-specific weaknesses tend to be larger, older, and financially 
stronger and also have more complex operations and more growth. It seems logical 
that severe, account-specific issues are more common in mature entities that are 
more likely to face complex accounting issues than smaller and less complex enti-
ties. (Doyle, Ge, and McVay 2007: 205-206, 214) 
 
A company-level material weakness is more invasive and caused by a failing in a 
macro-level control, like the control environment the entire process of financial re-
porting. Such a pervasive internal control deficiency could pose severe issues for 
conducting the audit and obtaining sufficient audit evidence, and could lead to ques-
tioning the entity’s ability to prepare reliable financial statements. Entities with com-
pany-level weaknesses are found to be younger, smaller, and financially weaker as 
well as less complex. Overall, entities with severe internal control issues appear to 
lack the resources or proficiency to manage a strong internal control system. (Doyle, 
Ge, and McVay 2007: 205-206, 213-214) 
 
In general, the study found that a material weakness in internal control is more likely 
for entities that are smaller, younger, less profitable, more complex, growing rapidly, 
or undergoing restructuring (Doyle, Ge, and McVay 2007: 220). These results are 
similar to those obtained from the study of Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., with the latter 
also finding that auditor resignations could be indicative of internal control deficien-
cies. Both studies found a link between complexity of operations and internal control 
deficiencies, which is logical, as the more complex an entity becomes the higher the 
demands for internal control become; as complexity increases, operations often be-
come more spread out, which puts a strain on internal control. Restructuring of op-
erations, which may come about due to mergers and acquisitions, requires changes 
to internal controls, and in if these changes are not implemented with due care, 
internal control deficiencies may be created. Growing entities face a similar threat 
to internal control, as internal controls may not keep up with the expanding opera-
tions, and smaller or financially distressed entities may simply lack the resources to 
dedicate due care for maintaining a functioning internal control system. 
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3 Determinants of Audit Fees 
 
3.1 Overview of Audit Pricing Theory 
 
Audit fees and their determinants have been widely researched all over the world. 
As reporting audit fees in the financial statements is becoming increasingly popular, 
the availability of data is increasing, opening further opportunities for audit pricing 
research. One of the founding fathers of audit pricing research is Simunic, who in 
1980 researched the determinants of audit fees. He hypothesized that size, com-
plexity of operations, financial statement components that are difficult to audit, in-
dustry, and form of ownership of the auditee would affect the auditor’s exposure to 
loss, which would in turn affect the audit fee. In his audit-pricing model, Simunic also 
included profitability, loss, reception of a qualified opinion, and the length of time the 
current auditor has been auditing the auditee, while form of ownership was not in-
cluded in the model. Simunic found a statistically significant relationship between 
audit fees all the determinants he identified except for profitability. (Simunic 1980: 
172, 176, 186-187) 
 
While later research has used identified several other determinants of audit fees, 
the determinants Simunic found in his research are still at the core of audit fee re-
search. However, some of the determinants have been found to have a different 
impact on audit fees across countries (Nikkinen & Sahlström 2004: 261). The effects 
that determinants have on audit fees can also differ from one study to another within 
the same geographical area, but for many independent variables the results are 
consistent when looking at a greater number of studies (Hay et al. 2006: 141). The 
rest of this section outlines the determinants of audit fees used in audit fee research, 
and examines their relationship to audit fees. 
 
3.2 Size 
 
According to Hay, Knechel, and Wong’s 2006 meta-analysis study, the size of the 
auditee is the most dominant determinant of audit fees, found in virtually all pub-
lished studies they examined. Their meta-analysis points to a positive association 
between size of an entity and audit fees, and the analysis also suggests that size is 
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a critical explanatory variable for a model of audit fees. The size of the auditee is 
most commonly measured by its total assets and occasionally by its revenue. 
 
There are some issues in regard to using revenue as a determinant of audit fees: 
firstly, the definition of turnover may vary from industry to industry and secondly, 
larger sales volume does not necessarily increase the amount of audit work (Chan, 
Ezzamel, and Gwilliam 1993: 766). Simunic remarks that external auditors have 
traditionally approached the audit from the balance sheet, relying on the assumption 
that if the balance sheet is verified, its components will indirectly verify the income 
statement. He also notes that auditing is a sampling-based process, and the greater 
the total assets the elements that it consists of become more numerous, resulting 
in larger sample sizes and thus more work. (Simunic 1980: 172) 
 
Even though size is quite clearly an important determinant of audit fees, there has 
been some criticism towards the assumption of a linear relationship between size of 
the auditee and audit fees. Typical fee models, which do not account for a non-linear 
relationship between size and fees, may influence tests of determinants of audit 
fees. (Carson, Fargher, Simon, and Taylor 2004: 89)  
 
3.3 Complexity 
 
When an entity is more diverse and decentralised, the number of decision centres 
increases, and more monitoring of these decision centres is needed. (Simunic, 
1980: 172) Therefore, the more complex a client is, the harder it is to audit. In prior 
research, complexity has been measured in several different ways, the most typical 
being the number of subsidiaries, the number of foreign subsidiaries, and the pro-
portion of foreign assets. While the measures for complexity have been varied, pre-
vious empirical evidence shows strong support to a positive correlation between 
complexity and audit fees. (Hay et al 2006: 169) 
 
Audits of parent companies could be presumed to be more complex, and thus labo-
rious, than audits of non-parents, as auditors of parent companies are usually re-
quired to audit not only the parent company’s financial statements but the group’s 
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consolidated financial statements as well. Conducting audits of several group com-
panies, as opposed to one audit for a company the size of all group companies 
combined, increases statutory reporting requirements, which in turn may lower the 
levels of materiality for subsidiaries below the materiality thresholds established at 
the group level. Lower levels of materiality tend to result in more audit work. A group 
auditor also needs to audit intragroup transactions, if such transactions have taken 
place during the fiscal year being audited. (Chan et al. 1993: 767) 
 
Audits of foreign subsidiaries should be costlier than audits of similar domestic com-
panies, as the complexity of financial reporting is greater for them. Differing account-
ing rules between countries result in the subsidiary producing at least two sets of 
financial statements – one set that complies with regulations in the country in which 
it is operating, and another set that follows the accounting rules and regulations of 
the parent company and can be used for consolidation of group financial statements. 
Often foreign subsidiaries operate in a different currency from the parent company’s 
operational currency, making foreign currency translations necessary.  (Niemi 2005: 
308-309, 311) 
 
3.4 Audit Risk 
 
Most auditors plan their audit approach using an audit risk model, where the per-
ceived audit risk is used to determine the extent and scope of audit testing. Audit 
risk is the risk that the auditor gives an unmodified opinion when the financial state-
ments contain a material misstatement. Audit risk can be broken down into three 
different factors: 
 
ܣݑ݀݅ݐ	ܴ݅ݏ݇ ൌ ܫ݄݊݁ݎ݁݊ݐ	ܴ݅ݏ݇	 ൈ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈	ܴ݅ݏ݇	 ൈ ܦ݁ݐ݁ܿݐ݅݋݊	ܴ݅ݏ݇ 
 
Inherent risk and control risk can be combined as the risk of material misstatement, 
where inherent risk is the part of the risk that does not result from an internal control 
deficiency. The risk of material misstatement depends on the client, and the auditor 
has little control over it. Detection risk is the risk that the audit procedures fail to 
detect a misstatement, which could individually or combined to other misstatements 
result in a material misstatement. The auditor influences audit risk by setting the 
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level of detection risk. Therefore, if the risk of material misstatement is high, the 
auditor will plan to conduct more audit testing to reduce the detection risk and thus 
reduce the overall audit risk. Interviews conducted with representatives of the lead-
ing audit firms in 1993 confirmed that audit risk is a significant factor in planning the 
amount of audit work to be completed and by consequence the audit fee charged. 
(Eilifsen et al 2014: 96; Chan et al. 1993: 769) 
 
Audit risk is difficult to measure directly, making it difficult to study its effect on audit 
fees. Inherent risk may increase audit fees, as it may require specialised audit pro-
cedures. Two areas that are often attributed as difficult to audit are inventory and 
receivables. Most often inherent risk is measured by inventory as a portion of total 
assets, receivables as a portion of total assets, or the combination of inventory and 
receivables as a portion of total assets. (Chan et al. 1993: 769; Hay et al 2006: 170, 
Simunic 1980: 173) 
 
3.5 Profitability and Leverage 
 
If an entity has poor profitability, it is more likely that the auditor will be exposed to 
a loss. In most previous studies, a ratio of net income divided by total assets and/or 
a dummy variable for loss is used to measure profitability. The expected relation-
ships between return on assets (ROA) and a loss with audit fees are negative and 
positive, respectively. Previous studies show a mixed result for the profitability ratio, 
but there is a significant negative overall result. Some previous research has found 
the dummy variable of loss to have a significant and positive effect on audit fees. 
The mixed results suggest that auditors may not put as much emphasis on differ-
ences in these metrics when pricing the audit as the model suggests.  (Hay et al 
2006: 170-171) 
 
Leverage is another measure of potential exposure to risk of loss for the auditor 
(Simunic 1980). The expected relationship between audit fees and leverage, meas-
ured with the ratio to debt to total assets, is positive – the more debt there is, the 
higher the audit fees are expected to be. This is because a highly indebted entity 
has a greater risk of bankruptcy. The quick ratio, which is the ratio of current assets 
to less inventories to current liabilities and thus measures the entity’s short-term 
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liquidity, is also used in several studies, and it has a negative relationship with audit 
fees. (Hay et al 2006: 171; Nikkinen & Sahlström 2004: 255) 
 
3.6 Form of Ownership 
 
According to the agency theory, there is information asymmetry and conflicts of in-
terest between the management and owners of an entity. Resolving this asymmetry 
and conflicts of interest result in agency costs, for example the price of an audit 
conducted by an independent auditor. If an entity is both managed and owned by 
the same individuals, the asymmetry of information is reduced and interests coin-
cide to a greater extent, leading to fewer conflicts of interest. Nikkinen and Sahl-
ström have proposed that there should be a negative relationship between audit 
fees and management ownership, as an entity with more management ownership 
should have lower agency costs, as per the agency theory. In their 2004 study span-
ning seven countries that represented different kinds of accounting environments, 
Nikkinen and Sahlström found evidence for the existence of the negative relation-
ship, concluding that the amount of management ownership affects the audit fees. 
(Nikkinen & Sahlström 2004: 255, 261) 
 
Another way of looking at the relationship between ownership and audit fees is to 
consider the ownership structure. It has been hypothesized in a 1993 study by Chan 
et al. that far spread ownership creates a need for a more extensive and high-quality 
audit than an audit fulfilling the statutory requirements. This hypothesis is based on 
the idea of ownership control: major shareholders are assumed to be able to monitor 
the entity and control management directly or indirectly, reducing the need for addi-
tional audit work exceeding the requirements of a statutory audit, and consequently, 
lowering audit fees. The study found that ownership control was an important deter-
minant of audit fees. (Chan et al. 1993: 770, 780) 
 
3.7 Free Cash Flow 
 
In prior research, it has been proposed that the higher free cash flow an entity has, 
the more severe its agency problem becomes. The more cash reserves an entity 
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has, the more choices the management has on how to use the funds, and this in-
creases the need of supervision of management behaviour. This oversight can be 
gained from an audit, and following this line of thought, Nikkinen and Sahlström 
bring forward the hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between free cash 
flow and audit fees. Regular debt payments may also help in keeping consumption 
of funds in check, and thus debt may in fact reduce agency costs. However, debt 
payments also decrease free cash flow. Nikkinen and Sahlström conclude that a 
positive relationship between free cash flow and audit fees is found in all of the 
seven countries studied in their research paper. (Nikkinen & Sahlström 2004: 255) 
 
3.8 Location 
 
Chan et al. investigated the relationship between geographic location and audit fees 
in the United Kingdom. They used a dummy variable to look at whether audit fees 
were higher in the London area in comparison to the rest of the UK and found that 
there was clear evidence for the presence of a London premium in audit fees. The 
presence of a London premium was also found to be statistically significant in a later 
study by Che-Ahmad and Houghton. The effect of several locations requiring on-
site visits has also been investigated, and was found to be statistically significant in 
a 1986 study, however, it can be argued that the number of locations requiring on-
site visits to conduct an audit is associated with auditee complexity. (Chan et al. 
1993: 770-771, 780-781; Palmrose 1986: 100; Che-Ahmad & Houghton 1996) 
 
3.9 Fiscal Year End Date 
 
In many countries, the most popular fiscal year end date is December 31st and due 
to this the demand for audit services is higher at the beginning of the year during 
the auditors’ busy season. In their study of quoted UK companies, Chan et al. meas-
ured the effect of fiscal year end date on audit fees. For their analysis, they divided 
their observations into groups based on the fiscal year end dates: fiscal years ending 
between December 1st and March 31st were considered to fall on the busy season. 
The study did not find the dummy variable for busy season to be statistically signif-
icant. (Chan et al. 1993: 770, 773) In another study by Che-Ahmad and Houghton, 
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it was similarly hypothesized that during the busy season when the auditors’ work-
load is higher, due to the higher demand or possibly higher costs, higher prices 
might be charged. The study also did not find a statistically significant link between 
fiscal year end coinciding with the busy season and higher audit fees. The lack of a 
statistically significant relationship between a fiscal year ending during the busy sea-
son and audit fees is consistent with the growing phenomenon of year-round audits, 
where some of the audit work is undertaken outside of the busy season. (Che-Ah-
mad & Houghton 1993) 
 
3.10 Audit Report Lag 
 
Audit report lag, or the time between fiscal year end and the date on which the audit 
report is issued, can be used as a determinant of audit fees. However, the relation-
ship between the length of the audit report lag and audit fees is not necessarily 
straight-forward. A long audit report lag can be indicative of audit problems that re-
quired more audit work to be resolved, in which case a short audit report lag would 
suggest less audit work and lower audit fees. But a short audit report lag may also 
reflect tighter reporting deadlines, which can be met only by employing a larger audit 
team or having the audit team work overtime, resulting in higher costs for the audit. 
The latter hypothesis has not been backed up by statistically significant evidence. 
Looking at larger number of studies, the expected relationship between audit report 
lag and audit fees is positive, and out of the twelve studies Hay et al. examined in 
their 2006 study, six showed a statistically significant positive association. (Chan et 
al. 1993: 770; Hay et al. 2006: 177) 
 
3.11 Auditor Attributes 
 
The audit market is rather concentrated, with the Big 4 (previously Big 5, Big 6, and 
Big 8) dominating the market especially when looking at the auditors of enlisted 
public companies. The meta-analysis carried out by Hay et al. found strong support 
that having a Big 4 (or Big 5, Big 6, Big 8) auditor has a positive relationship with 
audit fees. Having a Big 4 versus non-Big 4 auditor is sometimes used as a proxy 
for audit quality, and the higher audit quality of audits carried out by the Big 4 audit 
firms could in part account for the higher audit fees. In the study by Chan et al., audit 
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partners interviewed suggested that larger auditees tend to have audit teams with 
greater expertise, skills, and seniority, and that these qualities could be behind the 
higher audit fees. They also were of the view that the audit work conducted by such 
a team would be of higher quality, and that the higher quality would compensate for 
the increased fees. The same study also detected a Big 8 premium for both large 
and small auditees. (Hay et al. 2006: 176; Chan et al. 1993: 771, 783) 
 
In a 1981 study, DeAngelo concluded that there was a link between auditor size and 
perceived audit quality. This link resulted mainly from perceived independence from 
the client, as a larger auditor would be less likely to behave opportunistically to keep 
a client, as the client in question would make up a smaller fraction of the auditor’s 
clientele. (DeAngelo 1981: 197) In 2000, DeFond, Francis, and Wong conducted a 
study on publicly listed companies in Hong Kong and find that there is a Big 6 pre-
mium, and divide this premium into general brand name industry specialisation com-
ponents. (DeFond, Francis, and Wong 2000: 49, 57) 
 
Prior research suggests that a recent change of auditor could have a negative effect 
on audit fees. This effect is likely due to audit firms offering a discounted rate to win 
new clients, a phenomenon called low-balling, or the new auditor being more effi-
cient than the previous one. Based on the meta-analysis of Hay et al., a dummy 
variable indicating an auditor change seems to be the best proxy to use in audit fee 
models. (Hay et al. 2006: 176) 
 
3.12 Internal Control 
 
Simunic viewed auditing as a part of an entity’s financial reporting system, and con-
sidered that internal control could be viewed as a substitute to auditing (Simunic 
1980: 162). Therefore, the internal control environment of an entity is expected to 
influence audit fees. Gaining access to internal control data can be challenging, and 
there is no clear proxy to use for measuring an entity’s internal control. Some re-
searchers, who have had access to internal control data, have examined the rela-
tionship between internal auditing and audit fees, but the overall meta-result from 
their results are not statistically significant. (Hay et al. 2006: 175) Internal audit work 
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may be directly relevant for an external auditor, and in some cases an external au-
ditor may even choose to rely on the work of internal auditors, which would suggest 
that internal audit expenditure would decrease the amount of work for external au-
ditors and thus affect audit fees. Internal audits are, however, only a part of the 
internal control function, and only looking at the relationship between internal audits 
and audit fees does not give the full picture of the relationship between internal con-
trol and audit fees. (Eilifsen et al. 2014: 88, 688) 
 
Palmrose used the percentage reduction of audit fees from auditee inputs as an 
independent variable in the 1986 study. These auditee inputs were defined as in-
creased internal audit activities, improvement of internal controls, and the use of 
client personnel for some audit tasks. The percentage figure was obtained from a 
survey given to the auditees, and survey research has its limitations. (Palmrose 
1986: 100) 
 
The implementation of SOX Section 404 has made another way of measuring inter-
nal control possible, as Section 404 requires entities to disclose material weak-
nesses in internal control. In a research paper on the effect of SOX Section 404 
material weakness disclosures on audit fees from 2006, Raghunandan and Rama 
found that audit fees were 43 percent higher for clients with a material weakness 
disclosure pursuant to Section 404 in comparison to clients lacking such disclosure. 
This suggests that having a material weakness in internal control increases audit 
fees, which to some extent supports the idea of internal control and auditing being 
each other’s substitutes, as an internal control deficiency leads to higher audit ex-
penditure. (Raghunandan and Rama 2006: 112)  
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4 Determinants of Audit Report Lag 
 
4.1 Overview of Audit Report Lag 
 
Audit report lag is the length of time auditors need to complete an audit, measured 
in the number of days between the end of the auditee’s fiscal year and the audit 
report date. Audit report lag can affect the date of accounting disclosures, which is 
significant, as the information value of the financial statements declines as the audit 
report lag increases. In fact, the timely confirmation of financial figures is arguably 
one of the primary benefits of audited financial statements. Unexpected delays in 
financial reporting have also been linked to lower quality of information, increasing 
incentives to keep the audit report lag at the relatively the same length from one 
year to another. Audit report lag may also be used as a measure of audit efficiency, 
as encountering unexpected problems regarding the audit and not being able to 
resolve sensitive audit issues in a timely manner can increase the audit report lag. 
Some determinants of audit report lag may thus provide further insight into audit 
efficiency. (Bamber, Smith Bamber, and Schoderbek 1993: 1; Knechel and Payne 
2001: 137; Hay et al. 2006: 177) 
 
Some determinants of audit report lag are the similar to those of audit fees, as fac-
tors that make an audit more time-consuming may affect both the audit fee and the 
audit report lag.  
 
4.2 Pressure for Prompt Reporting 
 
In addition to the ways in which size affects the amount of audit work, outlined in 
section 3.2, the size of the auditee can also affect the amount of external pressure 
to release the financial statement: larger audit clients are likely to face more external 
pressure to report earnings as soon as possible. Larger clients also tend to have 
more leverage to persuade their auditors to complete the audit in a timelier manner. 
If the auditee has favourable earnings news to announce, it is likely that manage-
ment will attempt to shorten the audit report lag in order to be able to announce the 
good earnings news as early as possible. In this case the entity’s management may 
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try to speed up the auditing process by negotiating a tighter audit schedule with the 
auditor. (Bamber et al. 1993: 7) 
 
4.3 Form of Ownership 
 
When ownership of the auditee is spread out, the number of individual investors 
relying on the auditee’s financial statement information is greater, which in turn in-
creases the exposure to litigation and adverse publicity. This increases the business 
risk of the auditor, which might persuade the auditor to carry out a more extensive 
audit. However, publicly held companies tend to experience shorter audit report lags 
than their privately held counterparts. A factor contributing to this outcome is that 
late financial reporting can result in a negative market reaction, incentivising public 
companies to keep their audit report lags shorter. The Securities Exchange Com-
mission enforce tighter deadlines for publicly traded companies that have a public 
float exceeding specified limits, which should decrease the audit report lag. (Bamber 
et al. 1993: 5; Ashton, Willingham, & Elliott 1987: 287; Munsif, Raghunandan, and 
Rama 2012: 205) 
 
4.4 Complexity 
 
Complexity affects the amount of required audit work, as the more diverse and com-
plex the auditee is, the higher the chance of a material misstatement becomes, 
which thus extends the amount of audit work required. Carrying out a more complex 
audit is more time-consuming, which prolongs the audit report lag. Bamber at al. 
measured audit complexity by the number of business segments and by the primary 
industry of an entity. Segment information reported in the financial statements also 
need to be audited, which increases the amount of audit work. As the entity’s oper-
ations become more diverse in nature, audit work may also become more strenu-
ous. The primary industry of an entity can also affect audit complexity, as some 
industries present industry-specific audit challenges, while other industries with 
lower inventory and fixed assets may be more straight-forward to audit. (Bamber et 
al. 1993: 5-6) 
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The presence of extraordinary items on the financial statements can increase the 
complexity of an audit. Extraordinary items are abnormal, nonrecurring events that 
are not a product of ordinary business operations. Management’s assertions and 
judgement are involved in the classification of extraordinary items, and these need 
to be verified. Additionally, a lower materiality threshold should be applied to ex-
traordinary items and thus their inspection requires more audit work. (Bamber et al. 
1993: 7) 
 
4.5 Profitability and Leverage 
 
An auditee’s weak financial situation increases the risk of loss exposure for the au-
ditor, as discussed in section 3.5. To mitigate this risk, the auditor will carry out more 
audit work, which may prolong the audit report lag. Besides looking at return on 
assets and the leverage ratio, net losses can also be used as a determinant of audit 
report lag. An entity reporting net losses might also suffer from issues such as in-
ventory obsolescence, and therefore more audit work is likely required to obtain a 
sufficient level of audit evidence. (Bamber et al. 1993: 5, 7) 
 
4.6 Audit Technology 
 
Bamber et al. also looked at the affect audit technology has on audit report lag. They 
brought forward the hypothesis that a structured audit approach under normal cir-
cumstances would lead to a longer audit report lag, but if unexpected events occur 
with the audit, a structured audit approach decreases the audit report lag. Bamber 
et al. define a structured audit approach as a standardised audit process which au-
ditors will follow in conducting the audit work, even if it leads to performing audit 
work or compiling documentation that only serves to fulfil the requirements of the 
process. However, the additional audit work conducted due to a structured audit 
approach is hypothesised to expedite the process of dealing with unanticipated oc-
currences. The study found that audit report lags were indeed on average longer for 
auditors following a structured audit approach, but that the structured audit ap-
proach enabled auditors to respond more quickly to unexpected occurrences, short-
ening the audit report lag in these situations. These results might suggest that the 
structured audit approach is more inefficient, or that the structured approach offers 
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some additional benefits in addition to shortening the audit report lag when unantic-
ipated events take place. (Bamber et al. 1993: 8-9, 19) 
 
However, after the 1993 study by Bamber et al., audit technology has been further 
developed and the audit technology used today is significantly different from the 
technology used over two decades ago. Use of advanced audit technology and data 
analyses has become increasingly important in auditing, and it has been proposed 
in more recent research that Big 4 auditors’ access to advanced audit technology 
makes them more efficient and may reduce the audit report lag. (Lee and Jahng 
2008: 30) 
 
4.7 Auditor’s Resources and Resource Allocation 
 
The use of audit report lag as a proxy for audit efficiency or amount of audit work 
has its limitations: it only measures the audit work conducted after the end of the 
fiscal year, not taking into account audit work taking place during the fiscal year 
under audit. Audit report lag also does not take into account the actual work hours 
of the auditors, as it is measured in days. An audit can be carried out in fewer days 
by increasing the number of hours dedicated to the audit per day, which can be 
achieved by increasing the number of audit team members or by having auditors 
work overtime. However, audit firms are limited by the fixed amount of personnel 
they employ, which to some extent mitigates the limitation of using days, as opposed 
to hours, as a measure for the duration of the audit. (Bamber et al. 1993: 19) A study 
by Knechel and Payne investigated the relationship between incremental audit effort 
and audit report lag, and found that increase in audit work, measured in hours, pro-
longed the audit report lag. (Knechel and Payne 2001: 145) 
 
Another aspect of that could influence audit report lag is the resources allocated to 
an audit engagement. The general assumption is that the more senior the members 
of the audit team are, the fewer the hours they require to complete the audit. This is 
based on the partners and managers having more experience, industry-specific 
knowledge, and an enhanced understanding of the significant risks associated with 
the audit. Other audit staff presumably tends to rely more on standardised proce-
dures, and has very limited experience in handling unanticipated occurrences. It 
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follows that all audit hours are not equal, and therefore the effect of rank efficiency 
needs to be taken under consideration when evaluating the relationship between 
audit hours worked and audit report lag. Knechel and Payne found that employing 
more experienced external audit personnel decreased the audit report lag. (Knechel 
and Payne 2001: 138-139) 
 
The availability of audit personnel has also been found to affect the audit report lag. 
During the busy season, auditors’ resources are stretched thin, and this could po-
tentially lead to longer audit report lags. Knechel and Payne discovered that entities 
with fiscal year end dates in December experienced longer audit report lags, but 
previous research on the effect of busy season is inconclusive. (Knechel and Payne 
2001: 145) 
 
4.8 Non-Audit Services 
 
Non-audit services can have different effects on audit report lag depending on the 
type of services being provided. Management advisory services have in previous 
studies been linked to more efficient audits, as knowledge gained from providing 
such services increases the auditor’s knowledge of the auditee. Conversely, tax 
services have been found to increase audit report lag, as complicated tax issues 
can have a direct impact on financial statements and thus tax issues need to be 
resolved before an audit report can be issued. Knechel and Payne found evidence 
that provision of management advisory services reduced the audit report lag and 
tax services increased the audit report lag. (Knechel and Payne 2001: 139, 145) 
 
4.9 Internal Control 
 
Similarly to audit fees, audit report lags are also affected by internal control. In their 
2012 study, Munsif, Raghunandan, and Rama found that audit report lags were 
longer for entities reporting material weaknesses in internal control for years 2008 
and 2009. The study also found that entities that had remediated previous internal 
control deficiencies experienced shorter audit report lags following such remedia-
tion, but that the audit report lags were still longer than the audit report lags of enti-
ties that had not disclosed material weaknesses at all. This supports Simunic’s view 
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of internal control and auditing being each other’s substitutes, as an increase in 
attention paid to internal control following a material weakness disclosure leads to 
less resources employed in auditing. (Munsif et al. 2012: 203) 
 
4.10 Other Determinants of Audit Report Lag 
 
Some other determinants of audit report lag used in prior research are auditor ten-
ure, type of audit opinion, and audit fees. The length of auditor tenure may affect 
audit report lag, as the longer the auditor tenure is, the more familiar the auditor is 
with the entity and thus the auditor should become more efficient in conducting the 
audit, and thus auditor tenure should have a negative relationship to audit report 
lag. (Ashton et al. 1987: 284) An auditor will likely issue a qualified audit opinion 
only after devoting considerable time and effort into audit procedures in order to 
avoid issuing a qualified audit opinion, and therefore qualified audit opinions are 
likely associated with longer audit report lags. It has been the general finding in prior 
research that entities with qualified audit opinions have longer audit report lags. 
(Bamber et al. 1993: 7; Ashton et al. 1987: 287) 
 
In section 3.10, audit report lag was presented as a determinant of audit fees, and 
conversely, audit fees can also be used as a determinant of audit report lag. As both 
audit fees and audit report lag can be seen as a measurement of the extent of an 
audit, it logically follows that they would be each other’s determinants. A higher audit 
fee suggests more audit work, which may indicate a longer audit report lag, how-
ever, this depends on how the audit work is timed. Interim audit work increases the 
audit fee, but does not increase the audit report lag, as interim work is carried out 
prior to the end of the fiscal year. Also, an audit carried out with a larger audit team 
may increase audit fees, but decrease duration of the audit, and thus the audit report 
lag. Prior research suggests that audit fee has a negative relationship with audit 
report lag. (Munsif et al. 2012: 213)  
30 
 
5 Data and Methods 
 
5.1 Data 
 
5.1.1 Data Selection 
 
The data used for this thesis was obtained from Compustat and AuditAnalytics da-
tabases and the data was combined using company identifiers and fiscal years. The 
data consists of financial information of U.S. companies with fiscal years ending 
between 01/01/2005 and 31/12/2015. SOX Section 404 was implemented in 2003, 
but additional guidance on its application was issued throughout 2004, and hence 
these early years of SOX Section 404 are left out of the scope of this study. As all 
data from the fiscal year 2016 is not yet available, the last year included is 2015. 
 
The data is processed to look for duplicates and missing values for the variables 
used in the analyses. There are four variables used in either the first and/or the 
second regression analysis that have missing values, and these are ROA, LEV, INV, 
and audit report lag. Both of the regression analyses to be conducted include ROA 
and LEV as variables, and hence all observations missing either one or both of these 
values are deleted. The resulting number of observations is 48,517. Out of these 
48,517 observations, the only variable with missing values is audit report lag. 2,940 
observations are missing the audit report lag figures, which are needed for the sec-
ond regression analysis, and thus for that analysis only the 45,577 observations that 
include the audit report lag figures will be used. 
 
5.1.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
The descriptive statistics for the variables to be used in the first regression analysis 
are summarized in table 1. As the natural logarithms of audit fees and total assets 
are used in the regression model, the descriptive statistics of these values as well 
as the original values are presented in the table. The data consists of 48,517 obser-
vations. 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics of Audit Fee Model Variables 
Variable N Mean Standard Deviation Q1 Median Q3 
ln(AF) 48 517 5.972 0.583 5.567 5.959 6.325
Audit 
Fee 
(MUSD) 
48 517 2.625 6.764 0.369 0.911 2.113
ln(TA) 48 517 2.859 0.964 2.196 2.843 3.471
Total  
Assets 
(MUSD) 
48 517 13 759.863 112 069.702 156.966 697.349 2 957.313
INV 48 517 0.082 0.124 0.000 0.021 0.123
ROA 48 517 – 0.013 2.174  – 0.019 0.021 0.066
LEV 48 517 0.557 0.509 0.327 0.536 0.754
BIG4 
(dummy) 48 517 0.71 0.454 0 1 1
ICW 
(dummy) 48 517 0.06 0.229 0 0 0
 
 
In the data set for the first regression analysis the minimum audit fee is 7,000 USD 
and the maximum audit fee is 181.4 MUSD, while total assets are between 0.2 
MUSD and 3,771,199.85 MUSD. 
 
Next we will look at Pearson’s product-moment correlations to enhance our under-
standing of the correlations between the independent variables in the audit fee 
model. 
 
Table 2 Pearson's Product-Moment Correlations of Independent Variables in the 
Audit Fee Model 
 ln(TA) INV ROA LEV BIG4 ICW 
ln(TA) 1 – 0.120* 0.020* 0.157* 0.441* – 0.094*
INV – 0.120* 1 – 0.002 – 0.047* – 0.026* 0.032*
ROA 0.020* – 0.002 1 – 0.182* 0.027* – 0.009
LEV 0.157* – 0.047* – 0.182* 1 – 0.010* 0.021*
BIG4 0.441* – 0.026* 0.027* – 0.010* 1 – 0.081*
ICW – 0.094* 0.032* – 0.009 0.021* – 0.081* 1
 
Correlations marked with an asterisk are statistically significant at the 0.05 level. As 
can be seen from the table, the highest correlation between independent variables 
is the correlation between the natural logarithm of total assets and the Big 4 dummy 
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variable with a Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.441. All correlations between in-
dependent variables are fairly low and do not suggest problems arising from collin-
earity. 
 
For the second regression analysis, only observations that include the figures for 
audit report lag are used. Even though some of the same variables are included in 
the first and the second regression analysis, the descriptive statistics of these vari-
ables differ in the two analyses as fewer observations are included in the data set 
used in the second regression analysis. The total number of observations that in-
clude values for all the variables used in the second regression analysis is 45,577. 
However, for this set of data, audit report lag is between 0 and 986 days. In order to 
eliminate outliers that would have a disproportionably large effect on the regression 
model, we will delete all observations with a reported audit report lag that is less 
than seven days or above 200 days. The descriptive statistics of the variables used 
in the second regression analysis are shown in table 3. 
 
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics for Audit Report Lag Model Variables 
Variable N Mean Standard Deviation Q1 Median Q3 
ln(ARL) 45 333 1.824 0.119 1.756 1.820 1.875
ARL (days) 45 333 69.41 21.585 57 66 75
ICW 
(dummy 
variable) 
45 333 0.06 0.229 0 0 0
ln(TA) 45 333 2.870 0.958 2.210 2.856 3.477
Total As-
sets 
(MUSD) 
45 333 13 614.510 111 627.967 162.307 717.772 2 999.206
ROA 45 333 – 0.003 2.234 – 0.015 0.022 0.067
LEV 45 333 0.555 0.457 0.329 0.537 0.752
LOSS 
(dummy 
variable) 
45 333 0.30 0.457 0 0 1
ln(AF) 45 333 5.975 0.579 5.576 5.962 6.325
Audit Fee 
(MUSD) 45 333 2.591 6.581 0.377 0.916 2.112
 
Audit report lag for this data set is from seven days to 199 days. The minimum and 
maximum values of audit fees and total assets are the same as in the data set for 
the first regression analysis. 
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We will now look at Pearson’s product-moment correlations to examine the correla-
tions between independent variables in the audit report lag model. 
 
Table 4 Pearson Product-Moment Correlations of Independent Variables in the 
Audit Report Lag Model 
 ICW ln(TA) ROA LEV LOSS ln(AF) 
ICW 1 – 0.102* – 0.010* 0.023* 0.109* – 0.024*
ln(TA) – 0.102* 1 0.011* 0.187* – 0.355* 0.785*
ROA – 0.010* 0.011* 1 – 0.177* – 0.080* 0.006
LEV 0.023* 0.187* – 0.177* 1 0.013* 0.091*
LOSS 0.109* – 0.355* – 0.080* 0.013* 1 – 0.188*
ln(AF) – 0.024* 0.785* 0.006 0.091* – 0.188* 1
 
In the table correlations that are statistically significant at the 0.05 level are marked 
with an asterisk. As seen from the table, the highest correlation is between the nat-
ural logarithm of total assets and the natural logarithm of audit fees, and the corre-
lation coefficient is 0.785. This correlation coefficient is high in comparison to the 
other correlation coefficients, but does it not necessarily mean that the correlation 
will cause issues for the regression analysis. To determine whether the correlation 
causes multicollinearity problems, further statistical tests are needed. 
 
5.2 Methods 
 
5.2.1 Multivariate Regression Analysis 
 
Regression analysis is a statistical method that can be used to investigate whether 
there is a causal relationship between two or more variables. It is one of the oldest 
multivariable methods that is still in use and also one of the most commonly used 
method for modelling reality, specifically the relationship between a dependent var-
iable and an independent variable or variables. However, only the development of 
computing capacity of the past few decades has enabled broader use of multivaria-
ble methods such as multivariate regression analysis, which is the term for a regres-
sion analysis involving more than one independent variable. The basic premise for 
multivariate regression analysis is that there is a correlation between the dependent 
variable and independent variables, but the independent variables do not neces-
sarily correlate with each other. In fact, correlation between independent variables 
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might distort the results of the analysis. (Yan 2009: 1; Metsämuuronen 2005: 581, 
658-659) 
 
The goal of multivariate regression analysis is to find a model for the relationship 
between the dependent variable and the independent variables. Regression analy-
sis can be utilised to search for independent variables that best explain the changes 
in the dependent variable. It can also be used to examine the extent to which inde-
pendent variables, known to be significant determinants of the dependent variable 
from previous research, have an effect on the dependent variable. For the purposes 
of this study, we use regression analysis for the latter objective. (Metsämuuronen 
2005: 660-661) 
 
The regression analysis usually follows a list of procedures. Firstly, and most im-
portantly, it is necessary to carefully determine whether the hypothesis under inves-
tigation can be studied using regression analysis. Secondly, the regression model 
is defined, based on prior research. The generalised model for regression analysis 
is 
 
ݕ ൌ ݂ሺݔଵ ൅ ݔଶ ൅ ⋯൅ ݔ௡ሻ ൅ ߝ, 
 
where y is the dependent variable, and ݔଵ ൅ ݔଶ ൅ ⋯൅ ݔ௡ are the independent varia-
bles, and ߝ is the random error, which can also be referred to as the residual. In this 
phase, the selection of appropriate variables is made. Thirdly, the data for the anal-
ysis is collected and processed so that it can be used in the analysis. Fourthly, the 
regression analysis is conducted – generally in the case of multivariate regression 
analysis this is done with the aid of statistical software. Fifthly, the selected model 
is carefully evaluated with various diagnosis methods to determine whether the 
model is sound and the assumptions of the regression analysis are met. 
(Metsämuuronen 2005: 659-660, 663; Yan 2009: 5) 
 
The essential underlying assumptions of the regression analysis model are normal-
ity and homoscedasticity. The model depends on the premise that the residuals – 
the part of the model which the independent variables fail to account for – follow a 
normal distribution and that their dispersion is homoscedastic. Another assumption 
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of the regression analysis is that independent variables correlate with the independ-
ent variable to some extent, but do not strongly correlate with each other. If such 
strong correlation between independent variables were present, this would lead to 
a problem of collinearity. For example, two independent variables that strongly cor-
relate with each other could be included in the same model, even though only one 
of these variables increases the coefficient of determination and inclusion of the 
other variable is redundant. (Metsämuuronen 2005: 659-660, 662; Yan 2009: 195-
196) 
 
5.2.2 Defining the Regression Models 
 
5.2.2.1 Defining the Audit Fee Regression Model 
 
A common methodology for studying the determinants of audit fees has developed 
and has been used in over 100 published journal articles. Typically, the model takes 
the following form: 
 
݈݊ሺ ௜݂ሻ ൌ ܾ଴ ൅ ܾଵ݈݊ሺܣ௜ሻ ൅ ∑ܾ௞݃௜௞ ൅ ∑ܾ௘݃௜௘ ൅ ݁௜, 
 
where ݈݊ሺ ௜݂ሻ is the natural log of the audit fee, ݈݊ሺܣ௜ሻ is the natural log of a size 
measure (usually total assets), and ݃௜௞ and ݃௜௘ are two groups of potential fee driv-
ers. The model is based on Simunic’s 1980 study, but the number of explanatory 
variables has substantially increased over the years. (Hay, Knechel, Wong 2006: 
147) 
 
In this study, we will use the following model to examine the relationship between a 
reported internal control weakness and audit fees: 
 
݈݊ሺܣܨሻ ൌ ܾ଴ ൅ ܾଵ ൈ ݈݊ሺܶܣሻ ൅ ܾଶ ൈ ܫܸܰ ൅ ܾଷ ൈ ܴܱܣ ൅ ܾସ ൈ ܮܧܸ ൅ ܾହ ൈ ܤܫܩ4 
൅	ܾ଺ ൈ ܫܥܹ. 
 
The variables are: 
 
݈݊ሺܣܨሻ = natural logarithm of audit fees 
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݈݊ሺܶܣሻ = natural logarithm of total assets at year-end 
ܫܸܰ = inventory as a proportion of total assets at year-end 
ܴܱܣ = return on assets (operating income/total assets) 
ܮܧܸ = leverage (total debt/total assets) 
ܤܫܩ4 = 1 if Big 4 auditor, else 0; and 
ܫܥܹ = 1 if an internal control weakness was reported, else 0. 
 
These variables were chosen based on prior research and availability of data. Size 
is the most common determinant included in studies of audit fees, and in line with 
Simunic, size is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. The natural log-
arithm of total assets is used to account for the non-linear relationship between audit 
fees and the size of an entity. The proxy for inherent risk is inventory as a portion of 
total assets. Profitability and leverage are measured by return on assets and debt 
as a portion of total assets, respectively. Two dummy variables were included to 
capture the effect of having a Big 4 auditor and reporting an internal control weak-
ness on audit fees. A similar model was used in Raghunandan and Rama’s 2006 
study on the relationship between material weakness disclosures and audit fees. 
(Raghunandan and Rama 2006: 103) 
 
Some variables were not included in the model due to the availability of data. Com-
plexity is often measured by the number of subsidiaries, or the number of foreign 
subsidiaries, or the amount of foreign sales. Several studies have used the combi-
nation of receivables and inventory as a portion of total assets to proxy inherent risk, 
but due to the availability of data only inventory is used in this model. 
 
Some determinants that were not included in Raghunandan and Rama’s study were 
excluded from the model. The dummy variable for loss was not included in the model 
as it had mixed results in prior research (Hay et al 2006: 170-171). As all the data 
was from public companies, the entities included in the study had a similar form of 
ownership, and therefore there was no need to include a variable to measure the 
effect of the form of ownership on audit fees. Some more experimental determi-
nants, such as free cash flow, location, fiscal year end date, and audit report lag 
were also left out of the model. 
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Based on previous research, presented in section 3, we hypothesize that the inde-
pendent variables will have the following relationships with the dependent variable: 
 
Table 5 Hypothesized Relationships between the Dependent Variable ln(AF) and 
the Independent Variables 
Independent variable Relationship to dependent variable ln(AF) 
ln(TA) + 
INV + 
ROA – 
LEV + 
BIG4 + 
ICW + 
 
5.2.2.2 Defining the Audit Report Lag Regression Model 
 
Similarly to audit fee research, previous audit report lag research has used regres-
sion analysis as a way to find a model to describe the determinants of audit report 
lag. Many of the variables used by Munsif et al. are also included in our model. In 
order to increase the coefficient of determination of the model we will take the nat-
ural logarithm of audit report lag, total assets, and audit fees, as opposed to using 
the raw values. The model used to examine audit report lag is below.  
 
݈݊ሺܣܴܮሻ ൌ ܾ଴ ൅ ܾଵ ൈ ܫܥܹ ൅ ܾଶ ൈ ݈݊ሺܶܣሻ ൅ ܾଷ ൈ ܴܱܣ ൅ ܾସ ൈ ܮܧܸ ൅ ܾହ ൈ ܮܱܵܵ 
൅ܾ଺ ൈ ݈݊ሺܣܨሻ 
 
The variables are: 
 
݈݊ሺܣܴܮሻ = natural logarithm of the number of days between fiscal year-end and  
      date of the audit report 
ܫܥܹ = 1 if an internal control weakness was reported, else 0 
݈݊ሺܶܣሻ = natural logarithm of total assets at year-end 
ܴܱܣ = return on assets (operating income/total assets) 
ܮܧܹ = leverage (total debt/total assets) 
ܮܱܵܵ = 1 loss, else 0; and 
݈݊ሺܣܨሻ = natural logarithm of audit fees. 
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Size is again measured by the natural logarithm of total assets, while profitability 
and leverage is measured by return on assets, debt as a portion of total assets, and 
a dummy variable for loss. Internal control is measured by a dummy variable for 
reported internal control weaknesses. The model also includes the natural logarithm 
of audit fees. 
 
Based on previous research, we hypothesise that the independent variables will 
have the following relationships with the dependent variable: 
 
Table 6 Hypothesized Relationships between the Dependent Variable ln(ARL) and 
the Independent Variables 
Independent variable Relationship to dependent variable ln(ARL) 
ln(TA) – 
ICW + 
ROA – 
LEV + 
LOSS + 
ln(AF) – 
 
5.2.3 Limitations of the Models 
 
As all empirical models, the model used suffers from an omitted variables problem, 
which means that all significant variables are not included in the model (Hay et al 
2006: 179-180). Additionally, as with all multivariable analysis, in multivariate re-
gression analysis choosing inessential variables will lead to uncertain or unstable 
results. (Metsämuuronen 2005: 661) The latter issue can be eliminated by carefully 
choosing the variables, which has been done in this study. However, only data from 
the AuditAnalytics and Compustat databases were used, which limited the selection 
of variables for the regression model. Both databases are limited to publicly availa-
ble data.  
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6 Findings 
 
6.1 Results of the Multivariate Regression Analyses 
 
6.1.1 Audit Fee Model Results 
 
In 5.2.2.1, the following model for examining the effect of a reported internal control 
weakness on audit fee was formulated: 
 
݈݊ሺܣܨሻ ൌ ܾ଴ ൅ ܾଵ ൈ ݈݊ሺܶܣሻ ൅ ܾଶ ൈ ܫܸܰ ൅ ܾଷ ൈ ܴܱܣ ൅ ܾସ ൈ ܮܧܸ ൅ ܾହ ൈ ܤܫܩ4 
൅ܾ଺ ൈ ܫܥܹ. 
 
In this model, the natural logarithm of audit fees is the dependent variable while the 
natural logarithm of total assets, inventory as a proportion of total assets at year-
end, ROA, leverage, Big 4 auditor, and internal control weakness are independent 
variables. Using SPSS, the regression model is run on the data (see 5.1.1 Data 
Selection) to determine the coefficients of the regression model. 
 
The residuals show some heteroscedasticity (see section 6.2.1) and therefore the 
standard errors need to be corrected for heteroscedasticity. To account for this, we 
will need to correct the standard errors by using the method developed by White in 
1980, which can be done with SPSS with a macro by Hayes and Cai from their 2007 
research paper. (Hair et al 2014: 179-180; White 1980; Hayes and Cai 2007: 718) 
Running this macro produces heteroscedasticity-corrected values of standard er-
rors, t-values, and p-values for the variables of the model. Table 7 shows the heter-
oscedasticity-consistent regression results: 
Table 7 Multivariate Regression Results, Dependent Variable ln(AF) 
 Coefficients Standard Error t-value p-value 
Constant 4.506 0.008 598.661 0.000 
ln(TA) 0.411 0.003 141.481 0.000 
ROA – 0.004 0.003 – 1.326 0.185 
LEV – 0.026 0.019 – 1.391 0.164 
INV 0.390 0.012 32.291 0.000 
BIG4 0.371 0.004 86.137 0.000 
ICW 0.184 0.007 26.260 0.000 
R Squared 69.8 %  
40 
 
 
As seen in table 7, the coefficients of the independent variables vary from – 0.026 
to 0.411, with ROA and leverage having negative relationships with the dependent 
variable and the natural logarithm of total assets having the largest positive coeffi-
cient. The results of the t-test are shown in the as well, together with the calculated 
values for significance. The absolute t-values of ROA and LEV are below two and 
their p-values are above 0.05, and thus the variables are not statistically significant. 
All other variables are statistically significant, as their absolute t-values are larger 
than two and p-values are all 0.000 and thus smaller than 0.05. (Metsämuuronen 
2005: 666) 
 
Predictive accuracy of a regression model is most commonly measured by the co-
efficient of determination, denoted by R squared. The coefficient of determination is 
the squared correlation between the actual and predicted values of the dependent 
variable, and thus it represents the combined effects of all the independent variables 
and the intercept in predicting the dependent variable. The model has an R squared 
value of 69.8 %, which means that the model accounts for 69.8 percent of the vari-
ation of the dependent variable, the natural logarithm of audit fee. The R squared 
value increases as explanatory variables are added to the model, even if these var-
iables are superfluous. One way to mediate this is to use the adjusted R squared 
value, which only increases if the change in the R squared value due to the addition 
of an independent variable is more than would occur by chance. The adjusted R 
squared value for the model is 69.8 %, equal to the R squared value. This indicates 
that the model does not contain superfluous independent variables. (Hair, Black, 
Babin, & Anderson 2014: 160-161, 171) 
 
Placing the coefficients into the model gives us the following regression equation: 
 
݈݊ሺܣܨሻ ൌ 4.506 ൅ 0.411 ൈ ݈݊ሺܶܣሻ ൅ 0.390 ൈ ܫܸܰ െ 0.004 ൈ ܴܱܣ ൅ 0.026 ൈ ܮܧܸ 
൅	0.371 ൈ ܤܫܩ4 ൅ 0.184 ൈ ܫܥܹ. 
 
According to Halvorsen and Palmquist, the percentage effect of a continuous varia-
ble on the dependent variable equals to the coefficient of the continuous variable 
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multiplied by 100. In the model above, all but BIG4 and ICW are continuous varia-
bles. In order to interpret the effect that the dummy variables, BIG4 and ICW, have 
on audit fees, we use the following formula: 
 
݌ ൌ 100 ൈ ሺ݁ݔ݌ሺܿሻ െ 1ሻ, 
 
where ݌ = percentage effect of the dummy variable and ܿ = the coefficient of the 
dummy variable. By using this formula, we find that the percentage effect of BIG4 
on audit fees is 44.9 % and the percentage effect of ICW on audit fees is 20.2 %. 
 
Several continuous variables used in the audit fee model have extreme values. We 
will now conduct a sensitivity analysis to determine the effect that winsorizing con-
tinuous variables has on the results. The winsorizing will be conducted so that all 
values below the first percentile will be allocated the value of the first percentile and 
all values above the 99th percentile will be allocated the value of the 99th percentile. 
The regression analysis is then carried out using the winsorized continuous varia-
bles, and the standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity. The results of for 
the audit fee model are presented in table 8. 
 
Table 8 Sensitivity Analysis, Dependent Variable ln(AF) 
 Coefficients Standard Error t-value p-value 
Constant 4.466 0.005 845.072 0.000 
ln(TA) 0.463 0.002 218.218 0.000 
ROA – 0.270 0.006 – 42.646 0.000 
LEV – 0.207 0.006 – 32.643 0.000 
INV 0.466 0.012 39.326 0.000 
BIG4 0.340 0.004 93.593 0.000 
ICW 0.176 0.007 25.948 0.000 
R Squared 71.0 %  
 
The sensitivity analysis of the audit fee model shows that using winsorized continu-
ous variables increases the explanatory power of the model, as the coefficient of 
determination rises from 0.698 to 0.710. Coefficients of two variables, ROA and 
LEV, increase significantly, as in the original results they were close to zero and are 
now – 0.270 and – 0.207, respectively. All variables are statistically significant when 
winsorized values are used, while in the original analysis ROA and LEV were not 
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statistically significant. The coefficient of ICW decreases from 0.184 to 0.176, and 
accordingly the percentage effect of ICW is diminished from 20.2 % to 19.2 %. 
 
6.1.2 Audit Report Lag Model Results 
 
Another multivariate regression analysis was run to determine the relationship be-
tween internal control deficiencies and audit report lag. The dependent variable 
used was audit report lag, the independent variables were internal control weak-
ness, the natural logarithm of total assets, ROA, leverage, loss and the natural log-
arithm of audit fees. As the residuals show heteroscedasticity (see section 6.2.2), 
and therefore the standard errors, t-values and p-values of the regression results 
need to be corrected for heteroscedasticity. The heteroscedasticity-consistent re-
gression results are shown in the table below. 
 
Table 9 Multivariate Regression Results, Dependent Variable ln(ARL) 
 Coefficients Standard Error t-value p-value 
Constant 2.021 0.008 239.191 0.000 
ICW 0.090 0.003 36.551 0.000 
ln(TA) – 0.019 0.001 – 15.212 0.000 
ROA – 0.001 0.000 – 4.691 0.010 
LEV 0.006 0.003 1.730 0.084 
LOSS 0.025 0.001 20.210 0.000 
ln(AF) – 0.026 0.002 – 15.301 0.000 
R Squared 13.5 %  
 
Based on these results, it appears all variables apart from LEV are statistically sig-
nificant, as their absolute t-values are above two and p-values below 0.05. LEV is 
not statistically significant, as its absolute t-value is below two and p-value above 
0.05. All variables have coefficients that are quite small, with ICW having the largest 
coefficient of 0.090. Placing the coefficients into the model gives us the following 
regression equation: 
 
݈݊ሺܣܴܮሻ ൌ 2.021 െ 0.090 ൈ ܫܥܹ െ 0.019 ൈ ݈݊ሺܶܣሻ െ 0.001 ൈ ܴܱܣ ൅ 0.006 ൈ ܮܧܸ 
൅	0.025 ൈ ܮܱܵܵ െ 0.026 ൈ ݈݊ሺܣܨሻ. 
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To interpret the effect of the dummy variables LOSS and ICW on audit report lag, 
we will again use the formula from Halvorsen and Palmquist. By substituting the 
coefficients of LOSS and ICW into the formula, we find that the percentage effect of 
LOSS on audit report lag is 2.5 % and the percentage effect of ICW on audit report 
lag is 9.4 %. The model has an R squared value of 13.5 %, which is equal to the 
adjusted R square value. 
 
Similarly to the audit fee model, the audit report lag model also includes continuous 
variables that have extreme values, and a sensitivity analysis is also conducted for 
the audit report lag model. Winsorization of continuous variables is carried out in the 
same way as for the audit fee model variables. The multivariate regression is then 
conducted using the winsorized continuous variables. The results of this analysis 
are presented in table 10. 
 
Table 10 Sensitivity Analysis, Dependent Variable ln(ARL) 
 Coefficients Standard Error t-value p-value 
Constant 2.024 0.008 265.686 0.000 
ICW 0.088 0.002 36.755 0.000 
ln(TA) – 0.022 0.001 – 18.705 0.000 
ROA – 0.005 0.003 – 1.772 0.076 
LEV 0.018 0.002 8.265 0.000 
LOSS 0.022 0.001 15.972 0.000 
ln(AF) – 0.026 0.002 – 16.556 0.000 
R Squared 14.8 %  
 
The coefficient of determination is higher when the winsorized values for continuous 
variables are used, 14.8 % in comparison to the 13.5 % of the original analysis. 
There are some small changes in the coefficients, the largest change is for the co-
efficient of LEV, which increases from the 0.006 of the original analysis to 0.018. 
When using the winsorized values, all variables apart from ROA are statistically sig-
nificant. The coefficient of ICW is smaller than in the original analysis, but the 
change is only 0.002. As a result, the percentage effect of ICW on audit report lag 
decreases from 9.4 % to 9.2 %. 
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6.2 Model Diagnostics 
 
6.2.1 Audit Fee Model Diagnostics 
 
After running the multivariate regression analysis on SPSS, we will now test the 
model used in the multivariate regression analysis for normality, homoscedasticity, 
and lack of multicollinearity. If our model does not meet these three assumptions, 
the results produced by it would not be reliable. The assumption of normality means 
that the residuals follow a normal distribution. This can be detected by plotting a 
Normal P-P Plot: 
 
 
Figure 1 Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residuals, Dependent Vari-
able ln(AF) 
 
From this graph we can deduce that the residuals are normally distributed, as they 
fall very close to a straight line from the bottom left corner to the upper right corner. 
We can also plot a histogram showing the cumulative frequencies of residuals: 
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Figure 2 Histogram of Residuals, Dependent Variable ln(AF) 
 
This histogram also shows that the residuals closely follow a normal distribution. We 
can thus conclude that our model meets the assumption of normality. (Metsämuuro-
nen 2005: 685-686) 
 
The assumption of homoscedasticity denotes that the residuals of the regression 
model should have a homoscedastic dispersion. This is best observed by plotting 
the studentized residuals against predicted values of the dependent variable. The 
resulting scatter plot including all the data points can be found in Appendix 1, but for 
clarity the axes have been adjusted to produce the following scatter plot. 
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Figure 3 Scatterplot, Dependent Variable ln(AF) 
 
As we can see, the residuals fall randomly, and their dispersion with regard to zero 
is relatively equal; there is no strong tendency for the residuals to be either less than 
or greater than zero. Similarly, there is no pattern for the large values of the pre-
dicted values of the dependent variable versus the small values. The scatter plot 
indicates that the dispersion of the residuals is rather homoscedastic, but there is 
some heteroscedasticity. This is why in 6.1.1 the standard errors were corrected by 
using a macro for SPSS from Hayes and Cai’s research paper from 2007, and het-
eroscedasticity-consistent regression results were produced (Hayes and Cai 2007: 
718).  
 
Finally, we will test whether the regression model suffers from multicollinearity. 
There are several ways to test for multicollinearity, and we will begin by looking at 
the tolerance and VIF values calculated using SPSS presented in table 11. 
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Table 11 Tolerance and VIF Values, Dependent Variable ln(AF) 
 Coefficients Tolerance VIF 
Constant 4.506 – –
ln(TA) 0.411 0.764 1.308
ROA – 0.004 0.964 1.037
LEV – 0.026 0.932 1.073
INV 0.390 0.984 1.017
BIG4 0.371 0.797 1.255
ICW 0.184 0.988 1.012
 
The last two columns of the table display the tolerance and VIF values for the vari-
ables. These two statistics can be used to evaluate whether there is multicollinearity. 
The tolerance value ranges from zero to one, with values close to zero suggesting 
that there might be multicollinearity. VIF, variance inflation factor, is the multiplica-
tive inverse of tolerance, 1/tolerance, and a large VIF value would suggest multicol-
linearity. As both the tolerance values and the VIF values are relatively close to one, 
with the average tolerance value being 0.904 and the average VIF value being 
1.117, the results of these statistics do not point to multicollinearity. Based on these 
two statistics, it appears that there is no multicollinearity. (Metsämuuronen 2005: 
672, 682) 
 
Another way to test for multicollinearity between the variables is to calculate the 
eigenvalues, condition indices, and variance proportions for the model using SPSS. 
The results are shown in the table below. 
 
Table 12 Multicollinearity Diagnostics, Dependent Variable ln(AF) 
Dimen-
sion 
Eigen-
value 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
Constant ln(TA) ROA LEV INV BIG4 ICW 
1 3.780 1.000 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
2 1.022 1.923 0.00 0.00 0.90 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
3 0.942 2.003 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.95
4 0.680 2.358 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.87 0.01 0.01
5 0.383 3.140 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.74 0.02 0.15 0.01
6 0.147 5.072 0.17 0.08 0.01 0.19 0.03 0.76 0.01
7 0.046 9.018 0.82 0.90 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.07 0.01
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If several eigenvalues of a model are equal or close to zero, this indicates strong 
correlation between the variables. In our model, the last dimension has an eigen-
value close to zero, which is common in a multivariate model, and does not in itself 
indicate multicollinearity. The condition indices in the next column also show no sign 
of multicollinearity, as all values are below 15. A condition index above 15 would 
imply problems with multicollinearity, and a condition index above 30 would suggest 
major problems with multicollinearity. If several variables had both high condition 
indices and variance proportions, multicollinearity would be a problem. Based on 
these statistical tests, our model does not suffer from multicollinearity. 
(Metsämuuronen 2005: 683) 
 
Based on the model diagnostics we have conducted, our model meets the assump-
tions of the multivariate regression model; the residuals follow a normal distribution 
and are homoscedastic, and there is no multicollinearity. 
 
6.2.2 Audit Report Lag Model Diagnostics 
 
We will now carry out the same statistical tests for the audit report lag regression 
model. First, we will plot the production probability graph: 
 
Figure 4 Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual, Dependent Varia-
ble ln(ARL) 
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The thicker line shows the residuals, while the thinner line is a straight line drawn 
from the bottom left corner to the upper right corner. From comparing these two 
lines it’s apparent that while the residuals do not follow a straight line exactly, though 
they fall relatively close to the line. This deviation from a normal distribution can be 
further observed in the histogram in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5 Histogram, Dependent Variable ln(ARL) 
 
The histogram shows that the distribution is sharper than the normal distribution 
curve, and that there are more standardized residuals with a value over three than 
there are with a value below minus three. The assumption of residuals with a normal 
distribution is violated, but the violation is not extensive. 
 
Next we will plot studentisized residuals against their predicted values to test the 
assumption of homoscedasticity of the residuals. 
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Figure 6 Scatterplot, Dependent Variable ln(ARL) 
 
As seen from the scatter plot above, there is some heteroscedasticity, and as with 
the audit fee model, the standard errors need to be corrected to be heteroscedas-
ticity-consistent. The heteroscedasticity-consistent results were be presented in 
6.1.2. 
 
Lastly, we will test the independent variables of the regression model for multicollin-
earity. To do this, we will look at the eigenvalues, condition indices, and variance 
proportions of the model, which are shown in the table below. 
 
Table 13 Multicollinearity Diagnostics, Dependent Variable ln(ARL) 
Di-
men-
sion 
Eigen-
value 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
Constant ln(TA) ROA LOSS LEV ICW ln(AF) 
1 4.017 1.000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 
2 1.021 1.984 0.00 0.00 0.89 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
3 0.946 2.061 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.86 0.95 
4 0.667 2.454 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.73 0.02 0.10 0.01 
5 0.302 3.645 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.94 0.00 0.01 
6 0.044 9.506 0.04 0.43 0.00 0.20 0.01 0.01 0.01 
7 0.002 43.932 0.96 0.56 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 
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As noted in section 6.2.1, several eigenvalues close to zero would indicate a strong 
correlation between the variables. As seen in table 13, only the last dimension has 
an eigenvalue that is close to zero, and therefore the eigenvalues do not indicate 
multicollinearity. The condition index for the last dimension is quite high, and by itself 
would suggest that the model has problems with multicollinearity. However, the var-
iance proportions remain low, so there is no combination of a high condition index 
and high variance proportions, which would point to multicollinearity. (Metsämuuro-
nen 2005: 683) 
 
Next, we will calculate the tolerance and VIF values to further examine whether the 
model suffers from multicollinearity. The results from SPSS are presented in table 
14. 
 
Table 14 Tolerance and VIF Values, Dependent Variable ln(ARL) 
 Coefficients Tolerance VIF 
Constant 2.021 - - 
ln(TA) -0.019 0.320 3.127 
ROA -0.001 0.962 1.039 
LOSS 0.025 0.837 1.195 
LEV 0.006 0.915 1.092 
ICW 0.090 0.975 1.025 
ln(AF) -0.026 0.367 2.723 
 
Tolerance values close to zero would point to multicollinearity, and the lowest value 
found in the table above is 0.320 for ln(TA), and the second lowest tolerance value 
is 0.367 for ln(AF). All the other tolerance values are close to one. None of these 
values are so close to zero that they would indicate multicollinearity. The VIF values 
are all relatively low, with ln(TA) having the highest VIF value at 3.127 and ln(AF) 
having the second highest VIF value at 2.723. As with the tolerance values, the VIF 
values also do not suggest that the model has problems with multicollinearity. There 
is a positive relationship between ln(TA) and ln(AF), but this does not lead to multi-
collinearity for this regression model. Based on the tolerance and VIF values to-
gether with the values presented in table 14, we conclude that multicollinearity is 
not an issue for the audit report lag regression model. (Metsämuuronen 2005: 682)
52 
 
7 Discussion 
 
7.1 Relationship between Internal Control Deficiencies and Audit Fees 
 
The audit fee model has a coefficient of determination of 0.698, which suggests that 
the model developed accounts for well over half of the variation in audit fees. The 
majority of the important determinants of audit fees seem to be included in the 
model. As stated in 5.2.2.1, some determinants of audit fees found to be significant 
in prior research were not included in the model due to lack of data. Including vari-
ables such as receivables as a portion of total assets and the number of subsidiaries 
could further increase the explanatory power of the model. A dummy variable to 
account for the effect of the fiscal year end date coinciding with the busy season of 
the auditors could also be added, and the addition could potentially increase the 
explanatory power of the model. 
 
The following table shows the expected signs of the coefficients and the actual signs 
of the coefficients: 
 
Table 15 Hypothesized and Actual Signs of the Coefficients, Dependent Variable 
ln(AF) 
Independent variable Hypothesized sign Actual sign 
ln(TA) + + 
INV + + 
ROA – – 
LEV + – 
BIG4 + + 
ICW + + 
 
The signs of the coefficients of all but one variable correspond to the hypothesized 
signs and are in line with previous research results. LEV, debt as a portion of assets, 
is the only variable showing an opposite sign. However, as concluded in 6.1.1, ROA 
and LEV are not statistically significant in the heteroscedasticity-consistent results. 
It is not surprising that ROA is not a statistically significant variable, as auditors do 
not necessarily base their pricing on just the profitability. A low ROA in one year 
might not be a cause for concern if it is preceded by several years of higher returns, 
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and conversely a company that has seen low profitability for several years but sud-
denly has a profitable fiscal year will likely be seen as a riskier audit client. Changes 
in ROA might also not reflect the profitability of the company, as for example selling 
fixed assets would increase ROA, but not affect the company’s profitability overall. 
ROA can also vary depending on the industry, as asset-heavy industries will likely 
see lower ROA on average in comparison to industries that are less capital-inten-
sive. The audit fees might therefore not be very responsive to changes in ROA. The 
amount of debt as a portion of total assets might also not accurately capture the risk 
of loss exposure for the auditor, and consequently the indebtedness of the entity 
may not have such a direct effect on audit fees. 
 
In the sensitivity analysis carried out in 6.1.1, we found that winsorizing the contin-
uous variables prior to performing the regression analysis led to all variables being 
statistically significant. These regression results also showed a significant negative 
relationship between leverage and audit fees, that is, the higher the ratio of debt to 
total assets is, the lower the audit fees are. It could be that entities with debt need 
to monitor their financial situation more strenuously to make sure that they make 
their debt payments, and as a consequence have more evolved financial reporting, 
which makes the auditing more straight-forward. As pointed out in 3.7, regular debt 
payments decrease the amount of free cash flow, which has a positive relationship 
with audit fees, which could insinuate that higher debt payments would have a neg-
ative relationship with audit fees. However, as this result is contrary to what has 
been found in prior research, further research is required to make any conclusions 
on this. 
 
The hypothesis formulated in 1.2 was that audit fees would be higher for companies 
that have reported at least one internal control deficiency, and as we found that 
companies that reported at least one internal control deficiency had higher audit 
fees by 20.2 percent in comparison to companies reporting no internal control defi-
ciencies, the results support the hypothesis. Raghunandan and Rama’s study found 
a higher percentage of 43 percent, but the conclusion of a positive relationship be-
tween internal weakness disclosures and audit fees was the same. The result is 
therefore in line with prior research. The lower percentage could be due to the dif-
fering time period, as Raghunandan and Rama were investigating the effect in the 
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first years when SOX Section 404 required internal control material weakness dis-
closures. It could be that once both auditees and auditors became more familiar with 
the requirements of Section 404, the amount of additional audit work relating to in-
ternal control deficiencies decreased and thus the impact of a material weakness 
disclosure lessened to some extent. 
 
7.2 Relationship between Internal Control Deficiencies and Audit Report Lag 
 
The coefficient of determination of the audit report lag model is 0.135, which is quite 
low, suggesting that some determinants of audit report lag were not included in the 
model. Explanatory power of audit report lag models in previous research has gen-
erally varied between 20 – 40 percent, in comparison to which the explanatory 
model formulated in this thesis is somewhat lower. Based on prior research, such 
determinants could be the auditee’s complexity, measured by for example the num-
ber of business segments or primary industry, the use of a Big 4 auditor, provision 
of non-audit services by the auditor, auditor tenure, and audit opinion. 
 
In this thesis, audit report lag was used as a measure for the duration of the audit, 
as audit report lag data is readily available. However, several of the determinants 
found for audit report lag were more associated with the amount of audit work. Fur-
thermore, as the amount of interim audit work has increased, audit report lag be-
comes a more inaccurate measure of the overall duration of an audit. If the increase 
in the amount of audit work comes mainly in the form of increased interim audit work, 
the association between the amount of audit work and audit report lag becomes 
weaker, and therefore determinants of the amount of audit work would account for 
less of the variation in audit report lags.  
 
The following table summarises the predicted and actual signs of the coefficients of 
the audit report lag model: 
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Table 16 Hypothesized and Actual Signs of Coefficients, Dependent Variable 
ln(ARL) 
Independent variable Hypothesized sign Actual sign 
ln(TA) – – 
ICW + + 
ROA – – 
LEV + + 
LOSS + + 
ln(AF) – – 
 
As seen from the table, all coefficients have the hypothesized signs and thus the 
signs of the coefficients are in line with previous research. LEV was found to not be 
statistically significant, suggesting that a high amount of debt as a portion of total 
assets does not significantly increase the audit report lag. LOSS, however, was 
found to be statistically significant, and therefore it seems that a loss would increase 
the amount of audit work more than the leverage figure. All variables had relatively 
low coefficients, which means that they do not have a very strong effect on audit 
report lag. As discussed with the audit fee model, ROA does not capture changes 
in profitability perfectly, and the fluctuation in ROA might not greatly affect the audi-
tor’s loss exposure and therefore audit fees. It follows that ROA would not have a 
major effect on the amount of audit work, and via that, audit report lag. The size of 
the auditee has a negative relationship with audit report lag, hypothesized to be 
caused by the ability of a larger auditee to speed up the audit process. A larger 
auditee can often also be more complex to audit, which could somewhat lessen the 
negative affect that size has on audit report lag. Audit fees, unlike audit report lag, 
are affected by interim audit work, which could be one of the factors behind the fairly 
low coefficient. A longer audit report lag might also be caused by something that 
does not increase the amount of audit work, for example the auditee might be late 
in delivering some material required to complete the audit. If the amount of audit 
work is not increased, the audit fee is likely not affected. 
 
The hypothesis formulated in 1.2 stated that the audit report lag would be longer for 
entities that reported at least one internal control deficiency, and the results confirm 
the hypothesis. The percentage effect of at least one reported internal control ma-
terial weakness on audit report lag is 9.4 %. The positive relationship between audit 
report lag and internal control deficiencies is in line with previous research. 
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8 Conclusions 
 
The aim of the thesis was to investigate the relationship between a reported material 
weakness in internal control and audit fees and audit report lag. Based on prior 
research, the hypotheses were that a reported material weakness would increase 
audit fees and prolong the audit report lag, and both sets of the results of the re-
gression analyses supported these hypotheses. Some of the variables included in 
the models were not found to be statistically significant, but the effect of the dummy 
variable for internal control deficiencies was significant in both models. The percent-
age effect of the internal control deficiency variable was somewhat lower than in 
previous research, but the relationship between the dependent variables, audit fees 
and audit report lag, and the internal control deficiency variable was positive, which 
is in line with previous research. The coefficients of determination for the regression 
models were also lower than those in prior studies, which is likely due to the fewer 
number of variables included in the models. Increasing the number of significant 
variables included in the models would improve the coefficients of determination, 
and could also affect the percentage effect of the internal control deficiency variable. 
This study was limited to public data from Compustat and AuditAnalytics databases, 
which made the inclusion of some variables impossible. 
 
This thesis has expanded the body of knowledge regarding the effect of an internal 
control deficiency on the price and length of the audit. However, as discussed ear-
lier, audit report lag is not a perfect measurement for the duration of the audit, but it 
is the only publicly available measurement for the length of an audit. Data on the 
length of the audit measured in a different way, for example the hours of work put 
in by the auditors, or the duration of the audit fieldwork, could be used as a depend-
ent variable and could lead to a model that more accurately describes the relation-
ship between the length of audit and its determinants. Base on the results from this 
thesis, it seems that the variables used in the audit report lag model are either do 
not have strong relationships with the amount of audit work, or that the audit report 
lag is not extremely responsive to changes in the amount of audit work. The amount 
of audit work could have a stronger correlation to the amount of time between when 
the audit field work is initiated and the audit field work is concluded, for example. 
Different kinds of audit report lags could be used to establish a better measurement 
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for the amount of audit work completed, but this would require access to auditors’ 
records. 
 
In this thesis it was concluded that internal control deficiencies increase audit fees 
and prolong the audit report lag. For entities purchasing audit services, it is useful 
to know that having material weaknesses in internal control could lead to longer and 
costlier audits. The research result could be generalised to be that the state of in-
ternal control influences audit fees and audit report lags, and that entities wishing to 
lower their audit fees and shorten their audit report lags could consider improving 
the state of internal control. However, improving internal control requires resources 
and knowhow, which some entities may be reluctant to employ. Improving internal 
control may also be costly, and on the whole, it may be more cost-effective to pay 
higher audit fees than improve internal controls. More information on the relationship 
between internal control and audit fees, as well as internal control and audit report 
lag, can make the choice of resource allocation between internal control and audit-
ing a more informed choice.  
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Metsämuuronen, J. 2005, Tutkimuksen tekemisen perusteet ihmistieteissä, 3rd 
edition, Gummerus Kirjapaino Oy, Jyväskylä. 
 
Munsif, V., Raghunandan, K. & Rama, D.V. 2012, "Internal Control Reporting and 
Audit Report Lags: Further Evidence", Auditing, Volume 31, No. 3, pp. 203–218. 
 
Niemi, L. 2005, “Audit effort and fees under concentrated client ownership: 
Evidence from four international audit firms”, The International Journal of 
Accounting 40(4), pp. 303–323. 
 
Nikkinen, J., & Sahlström, P. 2004, “Does Agency Theory Provide a General 
Framework for Audit Pricing?”, International Journal of Auditing, 8, 3, pp. 253–262. 
 
Palmrose, Z. 1986, “Audit Fees and Auditor Size: Further Evidence”, Journal of 
Accounting Research, 24(1), pp. 97–110. 
 
Raghunandan, K., & Rama, D.V. 2006, “SOX Section 404 Material Weakness 
Disclosures and Audit Fees”, Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, Volume 25, 
No. 1, pp. 99–114. 
 
Securities and Exchange Commission 2013: https://www.sec.gov/answers/about-
lawsshtml.html#sox2002 
 
Simunic, D. A. 1980, “The pricing of audit services: Theory and evidence”, Journal 
of Accounting Research 18(1), pp. 161–190. 
 
White, H. 1980, “A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and 
a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity”, Econometrica, Volume 48, No. 4, pp. 817–
838. 
 
Yan, X. 2009, Linear Regression Analysis, World Scientific Publishing Company, 
Singapore. 
  
60 
 
Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Scatterplot of the Residuals of the Audit Fee Model 
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Appendix 2: Scatterplot of the Residuals of the Audit Report Lag Model 
 
 
